Published on Atlantis
On April 12, 2025
Dr. Irdi, you have long argued that Italy needs a National Security Council (hereafter NSC). As of today, our country is the only G7 member, along with Germany, that does not have such an institution. First of all, what is the NSC, and what functions does it serve in major Western democracies?
An NSC is a coordinating body where national security stakeholders are represented, including ministries, agencies, relevant state bodies, and sometimes, depending on the issues at hand, private companies of public interest or other entities. Looking at the NSCs established by our Allies, it is clear that each reflects the institutional structures and sensitivities of its own country. However, three common characteristics can be identified in the most successful experiences, which could also be replicated in a potential Italian NSC. First, the NSC should be a permanent body. In other words, its role should not be limited to crisis management but should involve a daily effort to continuously calibrate government policies. Consequently, it should not meet only at the highest levels but should be structured with a permanent technical staff to ensure the expertise and focus necessary to carry out its function. Second, the NSC should be led by a figure directly appointed and trusted by the head of government, with the authority to prioritize and reconcile the different administrations’ objectives into a coherent security policy. Regarding its functions, in major Western democracies, an NSC primarily focuses on analyzing national security threats. Unlike intelligence agencies, however, it also formulates policy proposals and recommendations for the government leadership. Even more importantly, NSCs typically operate based on a National Security Strategy, which they often draft and oversee in terms of execution. As you mentioned, Italy and Germany are the only G7 members without an NSC. However, unlike Italy, Germany has published a National Security Strategy, clearly defining its strategic interests and priorities.
What are the weaknesses of Italy’s current national security architecture? How could an NSC help address them?
Italy’s national security architecture suffers primarily from significant fragmentation and an outdated security concept that is overly focused on crisis management. There is no centralized coordination between the various agencies and institutions involved, except at high-level(CISR), semihigh-level (Technical CISR), or super-highlevel (Supreme Defense Council) meetings. The latter, which falls under the President of the Republic as commander of the armed forces, has a hyper-traditional military focus and highlights the division of security responsibilities between the executive branch and the presidency. More broadly, Italy’s institutional framework is overcrowded with committees, councils, task forces, commissions, and coordinating bodies, each holding a piece of the responsibilities that, in a more streamlined and efficient system, should be integrated. This fragmentation dilutes the overall effectiveness of national security policy, creating overlaps and complications not just in crisis management but, more crucially, in addressing long-term strategic challenges. These weaknesses become even more evident when dealing with non-traditional threats, such as hybrid influence campaigns that exploit the vulnerabilities of democratic systems. The speed and complexity with which these threats evolve require an equally dynamic and integrated response, which the current system is unable to guarantee. Establishing an NSC would be a fundamental step toward overcoming these limitations by promoting a unified, strategic vision of national security. A centralized structure could reduce competency overlaps, optimize available resources, and ensure faster, more targeted responses to systemic threats. Moreover, such an institution would align us more closely with our Allies and enhance our ability to protect national interests in the fullest sense.
In a November 2023 policy brief, you stated that the biggest challenge facing the West—and thus Italy—comes from “state actors who, benefiting from centralized decision-making and a lack of internal accountability, can leverage all aspects of their society to pursue goals of projection, penetration, and influence.” If quick decisionmaking and lack of accountability certainly give autocracies an advantage in global competition, what are the strengths of democracies?
The primary strength of democracies has always been their capacity for innovation, progress, and prosperity, which stems from individual freedom and pluralism of ideas. Competition, both economically and politically, fuels a dynamic and prosperous environment, accelerating innovation and efficiency. Additionally, the rule of law and property rights have historically ensured stability and social trust. These elements have long enabled democratic societies to lead in research and innovation. However, this advantage appears to be eroding, particularly in Europe. According to a recent European Commission statistic, the number of European companies among the 2,500 largest global R&D investors has halved since 2013. One key reason for this, in my view, is overregulation. Consider that between 2019 and 2024, the EU produced 13,492 legislative acts, compared to 3,725 in the U.S. Additionally, declining education quality, weakening public debate, and deteriorating political culture are contributing to the erosion of the West’s competitive edge. To maintain their global leadership, democracies must significantly increase investments in education and innovationand find a balance between deregulation and social welfare. Furthermore, we need to rethink the publicprivate relationship, given the growing strategic importance of technological progress across all sectors. In short, since the “engine” of democratic systems is bottom-up decision-making, we must ensure that the “fuel” is of high quality while also removing obstacles to its functioning. Failing to do so means abdicating our competitive advantage.
You describe two key aspects of the new authoritarian threat: asymmetry and gradual dispersion, which, in some ways, make this challenge distinct from those faced in the past by Italy’s security apparatus. However, one could argue that significant asymmetry already existed during the Cold War—such as Soviet disinformation campaigns in the West, which were much harder to replicate in the USSR. Hybrid warfare, fought through proxies, dispersed targets, and cross-domain actions, was already a reality then. Is technology the key difference between today’s threats and those of the past?
It is one of two major factors that have transformed the landscape. The first is a structural shift in power relations. For the first time since World War II, the West faces systemic adversaries that are approaching its economic and military capabilities, backed by superior demographic trajectories. The second is technology. The rise of computing and digitalization has exposed economies and critical infrastructures to disruptive, anonymous, and remote attacks. Data and public opinion are now vulnerable to disinformation and cognitive warfare. The spread of social media as a primary source of information is particularly significant, as it generates simplified, distorted perceptions of reality and weakens longterm concentration and critical thinking. Additionally, the advent of AI-driven mass data collection could further change the geopolitical game. Data from trade flows, health records, consumer behavior, and social media activity can now be processed into macro-inferences, which, in turn, can inform long-term industrial and strategic policies.
We talked about threats from state actors. What about threats from non-state actors, such as terrorist groups and transnational criminal organizations? Are they considered less dangerous for Italy?
While non-state actors such as terrorist groups and transnational criminal organizations do not pose a direct systemic threat to the foundations of liberal democracies, they can still pose significant dangers, especially if exploited as proxies by hostile external powers. Just think of the activities of the Wagner group in Africa, now bleakly renamed Africa Corps, and its involvement in activities such as the control of mineral resources in many of the countries where it is located. As regards Italy, I would say that there is a systemic impact of organized crime in an economic sense, in the sense that the distortion of the economy induced by its pervasiveness is a significant brake on the country’s growth. For the discussion that interests us, however, I would put non-state actors in a different category, and treat them as instruments of state actors.
Let’s go back to the topic of the National Security Strategy, briefly mentioned in the first answer. Several analysts argue that Italy should also adopt one, to analyze the risks and threats to the country system, define the objectives and priorities and provide a unified strategic framework. What is the point of communicating this information to the public?
Following the publication of the first German national security strategy, Italy remains the only G7 country not to have a document of this type. We are part of an increasingly narrow circle of countries that, for various historical, cultural and political reasons, have not been able to systematically develop and hierarchize their national security priorities. However, albeit with a certain delay, the discussion on the need to adopt a National Security Strategy is finally taking hold in Italy too. The fact that the topic has entered the public debate, and that the government has also expressed its intention to formulate one represents positive news in itself. Furthermore, we have said that liberal democracies are largely dependent on the education and awareness of their citizens, which makes the participation of civil society in the national security debate crucial. National security cannot be seen as an exclusive prerogative of the state apparatus or the armed forces; it is a collective objective that involves every citizen. In an era where threats are increasingly transversal and complex, cooperation between institutions, the private sector and citizens is fundamental to building lasting resilience.
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